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Abstract
A common assumption is that belief in conspiracy theories and supernatural
phenomena are grounded in illusory pattern perception. In the present
researchwe systematically tested this assumption. Study 1 revealed that such
irrational beliefs are related to perceiving patterns in randomly generated
coin toss outcomes. In Study 2, pattern search instructions exerted an indirect
effect on irrational beliefs through pattern perception. Study 3 revealed that
perceiving patterns in chaotic but not in structured paintings predicted
irrational beliefs. In Study 4, we found that agreement with texts supporting
paranormal phenomena or conspiracy theories predicted pattern perception.
In Study 5, we manipulated belief in a speciﬁc conspiracy theory. This
manipulation inﬂuenced the extent to which people perceive patterns in
world events, which in turn predicted unrelated irrational beliefs. We
conclude that illusory pattern perception is a central cognitive mechanism
accounting for conspiracy theories and supernatural beliefs.
People often hold irrational beliefs, which we broadly
deﬁne here as unfounded, unscientiﬁc, and illogical as-
sumptions about the world. Although many irrational
beliefs exist, belief in conspiracy theories and belief in
the supernatural are particularly prevalent among ordi-
nary, nonpathological citizens, and are frequent topics
of scientiﬁc research (Oliver & Wood, 2014; Sunstein
& Vermeule, 2009; Swami et al., 2013; Wiseman &
Watt, 2006). Conspiracy theories are commonly de-
ﬁned as the assumption that a group of people colludes
together in secret to attain evil goals (e.g., Zonis & Jo-
seph, 1994). While conspiracies can and do occur, and
hence not all conspiracy theories are irrational (e.g.,
Watergate; The Iran-Contra-Affair), many conspiracy
theories that citizens believe are unlikely in light of logic
or scientiﬁc evidence, including theories that 911 was
an inside job, that the pharmaceutical industry deliber-
ately spreads diseases, or that climate change is a lie
fabricated by scientists. Supernatural beliefs are deﬁned
as beliefs that violate scientiﬁcally founded principles of
nature, including superstition, belief in the paranormal,
horoscopes, and telepathy (Lindeman & Aarnio, 2007).
Such irrational beliefs are not necessarily harmless.
Belief in conspiracy theories predicts maladaptive
perceptions and behaviors such as withdrawal from
politics, decreased civic virtue, hostility, and radicaliza-
tion (Abalakina-Paap, Stephan, Craig, & Gregory,
1999; Goertzel, 1994; Jolley & Douglas, 2014a, 2014b;
Swami et al., 2011; Swami, Chamorro-Premuzic, &
Furnham, 2010; Van Prooijen, Krouwel, & Pollet,
2015). Supernatural beliefs may lead people to consult
spiritual healers instead of qualiﬁed medical specialists
to treat dangerous illnesses, or to base important life de-
cisions (e.g., whether to buy a house, or get a divorce)
on information derived from horoscopes or a random
draw of tarot cards (Asser & Swan, 1998; Ernst, 2000;
Mazur, 2008; Nahin, Barnes, Stussman, & Bloom,
2009; Shermer, 2011). These considerations suggest
that it is important to investigate how such beliefs orig-
inate in the human mind. In the present research we
investigate the overarching cognitive basis of the many
types of irrational beliefs that people hold.
It has frequently been suggested that irrational beliefs
are rooted in pattern perception, that is, the automatic
tendency to make sense of the world by identifying
meaningful relationships between stimuli (Zhao, Hahn,
& Osherson, 2014). This is a functional process, as it
enables people to recognize basic patterns that are real,
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and that are important to internalize (e.g., a red trafﬁc
light signals danger; drinking water quenches ones
thirst; being unfriendly to a stranger may elicit an un-
friendly response). Sometimes, however, there are dis-
tortions to this otherwise functional process as people
may connect dots that are in fact unrelated, leading to
illusory pattern perceptionmisperceiving meaningful
patterns in what are in fact random stimuli.
Such illusory pattern perception emerges because
people often have difﬁculty recognizing when stimuli
do or do not occur through a random process. For in-
stance, truly random sequences typically display less
variationand hence form more clustersthan people
intuitively expect, creating the feeling of meaningful
patterns that in fact occurred at random (Falk &Konold,
1997). Put differently, a random process often generates
sequences that appear nonrandom to the humanmind,
and that may even contain occasional symmetries or es-
thetic regularities. As a result, it is difﬁcult for people to
appreciate the role of coincidence in generating these
pattern-like sequences (Williams & Grifﬁths, 2013).
But whereas co-occurring stimuli may be generated
through either a nonrandom (i.e., actual patterns) or a
random process, only nonrandomly generated stimuli
can be considered meaningful as they have actual
predictive value for what future stimuli the same pro-
cess will generate. Illusory pattern perception occurs
when people mistakenly perceive randomly generated
stimuli as causally determined through a nonrandom
process, and hence as diagnostic for what future stimuli
to expect.
A common assumption, then, is that illusory pattern
perception is at the core of many of the irrational beliefs
that people hold (e.g., Shermer, 2011;Wiseman&Watt,
2006; Whitson & Galinsky, 2008). Given how
fundamental and widely accepted this assumption is,
however, it is surprising how little direct empirical evi-
dence there is available to support the role of illusory
pattern perception in irrational beliefs in general, and
particularly in the domain of conspiracy theories. The
current program of research is designed to ﬁll this void.
Illusory Pattern Perception and Irrational Beliefs
In numerous life domains, people make predictions of
future outcomes by searching for patterns in random
stimuli. For instance, illusory pattern perception shapes
peoples expectations during sports matches. In a study
of the hot hand in basketball, both spectators and
players believed that the chance of players hitting a shot
was related to the success of their previous shot. In
reality, the relationship between hits and misses of
succeeding shots by the same player did not statistically
deviate from chance (Gilovich, Vallone, & Tversky,
1985). Related to this, habitual gamblers aremore likely
than non-habitual gamblers to detect patterns in
random stimuli (Wilke, Scheibehenne, Gaissmaier,
McCanney, & Barrett, 2014). Even pigeons seem sub-
ject to illusory pattern perception. In a classic study by
Skinner (1948), hungry pigeons received food at regular
time intervals, and as a result, the pigeons increasingly
started doing whatever they were doing the last time
that they received food. As noted by Skinner, The
experiment might be said to demonstrate a sort of
superstition. The bird behaves as if there were a causal
relation between its behavior and the presentation of
food, although such a relation is lacking (p. 171).
Pattern perception thus enables people to predict an
uncertain future by connecting the dots and establish-
ing meaningful relations between stimuli. Such predic-
tions of future outcomes are also inherent in irrational
beliefs, which are frequently construed as ways to cope
with uncertain and complex life situations. One com-
mon proposition is that belief in conspiracy theories
often constitutes attempts to understand distressing
events that are difﬁcult to understand otherwise
(Hofstadter, 1966; see also Bale, 2007). Consistently,
impactful and threatening societal events increase peo-
ples sense-making motivationas reﬂected in feelings
of worry and a desire to ﬁnd out what happened
which subsequently increases belief in conspiracy theo-
ries (Van Prooijen & Van Dijk, 2014). In a similar vein,
supernatural beliefs help people to make sense of their
life and to predict the future. Supernatural beliefs have
been argued to imbue the world with meaning and
purpose, and therefore help people cope with the basic
uncertainties that are inherent to life (e.g., Mazur,
2008; Shermer, 2011). These arguments suggest that
irrational beliefs help people make sense of their world
by increasing a subjective sense of predictability, and
pattern perception is a key element of this process.
The desire to make sense of the world is of particular
importance to people when they lack control (Park,
2010) or when they are uncertain (Van den Bos,
2009). Consistently, empirical ﬁndings reveal that peo-
ple are particularly likely to believe conspiracy theories
when they lack control or are uncertain (Newheiser,
Farias, & Tausch, 2011; Marchlewska, Cichocka, &
Kossowska, in press; Sullivan, Landau, & Rothschild,
2010; Van Prooijen, 2016; Van Prooijen & Acker,
2015; Van Prooijen & Jostmann, 2013; for a review,
see Kossowska & Bukowski, 2015). Likewise, lacking
control or experiencing feelings of uncertainty have
been found to increase supernatural beliefs, in the form
of superstition (Whitson & Galinsky, 2008), belief in
horoscopes (Wang, Whitson, & Menon, 2012), and
increased religiosity (Hogg, Adelman, & Blagg, 2010;
Kay, Gaucher,McGregor, &Nash, 2010). These ﬁndings
are consistent with the idea that irrational beliefs are
rooted in pattern perception, as establishing relevant
patterns makes an unpredictable, uncertain, and poten-
tially threatening environment more predictable. In-
deed, control threats have been found to increase the
extent towhich peoplemisperceive patterns in random-
ness, and these ﬁndings closely mirrored the effects of
control threats on irrational beliefs in consecutive ex-
periments (Van Harreveld, Rutjens, Schneider, Nohlen,
& Keskinis, 2014; Whitson & Galinsky, 2008). These
studies render further plausibility to the idea that
pattern perception and irrational beliefs are grounded
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in a similar psychological function, namely, to imbue
the world with order.
Various complementary lines of research are consis-
tent with the general idea that irrational beliefs are
related to a tendency to misperceive patterns in ran-
domness. For instance, conspiracy beliefs are correlated
with constructs such as paranormal beliefs (Barron,
Morgan, Towell, Altemeyer, & Swami, 2014; Darwin,
Neave, & Holmes, 2011; Lobato, Mendoza, Sims, &
Chin, 2014; Newheiser et al., 2011; Swami et al.,
2011), the tendency to attribute agency and intentional-
ity where it does not exist (Douglas, Sutton, Callan,
Dawtry, & Harvey, 2016; Imhoff & Bruder, 2014), and
the conjunction fallacy (Brotherton & French, 2014;
for illustrations of the relationship of the conjunction
fallacywith paranormal belief, see Rogers, Davis, & Fisk,
2009; Rogers, Fisk, & Wiltshire, 2011). Although these
studies indicate links between conspiracy theories and
a variety of heuristics and cognitive biases, and are
therefore suggestive of a link between pattern percep-
tion and conspiracy belief, direct evidence is currently
lacking. Indeed, one recent study tested the relationship
of conspiracy beliefs with peoples subjective perception
of randomness in binary strings that varied in their
actual level of complexity. This study found no relation-
ship between conspiracy beliefs and subjective random-
ness (Dieguez, Wagner-Egger, & Gauvrit, 2015).
The relationship between illusory pattern perception
and supernatural beliefs has been tested more exten-
sively, and results are suggestive for such a relationship.
For instance, Valdesolo and Graham (2014) found that
supernatural beliefs were associated with agency detec-
tion, that is, the belief that events are caused intention-
ally by purposeful agents. Furthermore, supernatural
beliefs correlate with a tendency tomisperceive patterns
in randomness (e.g., Blackmore & Trościanko, 1985;
Bressan, 2002; Brugger, Landis, & Regard, 1990;
Dagnall, Parker, & Munley, 2007; Musch & Ehrenberg,
2002; for a review, see Wiseman & Watt, 2006). Also
for supernatural beliefs, however, this association does
not emerge in all studies (Roberts & Seager, 1999) and
under all circumstances (Blagrove, French, & Jones,
2006; Bressan, 2002). In the present research, therefore,
our aim was to expand on these insights through a
program of research designed to test the assertion that
irrational beliefsboth in conspiracies and the super-
naturalare empirically connected with a tendency to
perceive patterns in randomly generated stimuli.
Research Overview
In the present research, we conducted ﬁve studies in
which we focused on the relationship between irratio-
nal beliefs and illusory pattern perception. Consistent
with previous approaches, in Study 1 we ﬁrst tested if
conspiracy beliefs and supernatural beliefs are corre-
lated with a tendency to perceive patterns in randomly
generated coin toss outcomes (cf. Dagnall et al., 2007).
In Study 2, we manipulated whether participants
searched for patterns in these coin toss outcomes, and
tested whether this predicts irrational beliefs through
an increase in pattern perception. In Study 3, we
focused on pattern perception in visual stimuli (see also
Blackmore & Moore, 1994), and examined whether
pattern perception necessarily needs to be illusory to pre-
dict irrational beliefs. In Study 4, we manipulated
whether participants read a text supporting either para-
normal beliefs, conspiracy theories, or skepticism, and
we testedwhether agreement with these texts predicted
pattern perception. Finally, in Study 5, we manipulated
peoples belief in a speciﬁc conspiracy theory (cf. Jolley
& Douglas, 2014a, 2014b), and tested if this predicts
an increased tendency to perceive patterns in theworld,
belief in unrelated conspiracy theories, and supernatu-
ral beliefs.
Study 1
As a ﬁrst test we developed ameasure of pattern percep-
tion that was based on a randomly generated string of
coin toss outcomes. Speciﬁcally, we assessed whether
or not participants detected patterns in random coin toss
outcomes, and tested the correlations of such pattern
perception with irrational beliefs.
Method
Participants and design. This study had a cross-
sectional design, and was run online through the
Crowdﬂower foruma website for crowdsourcing that
closely resembles Amazons Mechanical Turk. The
studies reported in this article were programmed in
Qualtrics such that each IP-address could participate
only once. A total of 264 US participants completed
the study (89 men, 175 women; Mage = 36.61 years,
SD = 12.07). The study took about 15 to 20 minutes to
complete, and participants were awarded a small
payment (0.75 USD).
Measures. We assessed belief in conspiracy theories
with two complementary measures. First, we asked for
participants agreement with a series of well-known
conspiracy theories that are frequent topics of discussion
on conspiracy websites (e.g., Douglas & Sutton, 2011;
Van Prooijen et al., 2015). We speciﬁcally asked partici-
pants to indicate the degree to which they believed nine
statements are true (1 = deﬁnitely not true, 5 = deﬁnitely
true), for instance The US government deliberately
conceals a lot of information from the public, and
The US government had advance knowledge of the
9/11 attacks. These nine itemswere averaged into a re-
liable belief in existing conspiracy theories scale (α = .87)
(full materials, including all scale items, are in the
Supporting Materials).
Second, we measured belief in a ﬁctitious (i.e.,
experimenter-designed) conspiracy theory. This mea-
sure complements the existing conspiracy belief mea-
sure by soliciting responses that have not been
inﬂuenced by peers, the Internet, or social media. We
assessed an abbreviated (i.e., 9-item) and adapted
J.-W. van Prooijen et al. Illusory pattern perception
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version of Swami et al.s (2011) Red Bull conspiracy
theory measure. Example items are Red Bull contains
illegal substances that raise the desire for the product,
and The ofﬁcial inventor of Red Bull pays 10 million
Euro each year to keep food controllers quiet (1 = deﬁ-
nitely not true, 5 = deﬁnitely true). These items were
averaged into a reliable measure of belief in ﬁctitious
conspiracy theories (α = .92)
To measure supernatural beliefs, participants
responded to the validated, 30-item magical ideation
scale (Eckblad & Chapman, 1983), which we adapted
by asking participants to respond to the items on a scale
ranging from 1 (strongly disagree) to 5 (strongly agree).
Example items are I think I could learn to read other
peoples minds if I wanted to, Horoscopes are right
too often for it to be a coincidence, and Numbers like
13 and 7 have no special powers (reverse-coded).
Participants responses to these items were averaged
into a reliable supernatural belief scale (α = .93)
To develop a measure of pattern perception, we used
the website https://www.random.org to create a ran-
dom coin toss 100 times, with the only predetermined
restriction being 50 Heads and 50 Tails (i.e., the ex-
pected distribution in a random process). Then, we
subdivided the full sequence into 10 separate sets of 10
consecutive coin tosses. For each set, participants were
asked to rate the extent to which they believed the
sequence was fully random, or fully determined.
Responses were on a scale ranging from 1 (completely
random) to 7 (completely determined). Examples of coin se-
quences were HTHHTTTTHH and HHHTTTTTHH.
After the 10th sequence, participants were asked to an-
swer the following question on the same rating scale:
Now, imagine that the above items represent 100
consecutive throws with the same coin. Please again
rate how random or determined the outcomes are.
Together, the ratings of the 10 sets and the rating of
the full sequence formed a reliable 11-item pattern
perception scale (α = .95).1 At the end of the study,
participants were thanked and debriefed.
Results and Discussion
The results are displayed in Table 1. Perceiving patterns
in randomly generated coin toss outcomes was signiﬁ-
cantly correlated with both measures of conspiracy
beliefs, and with supernatural beliefs (rs > .36,
ps< .001). These ﬁndings are the ﬁrst to directly suggest
a relationship between belief in conspiracy theories and
pattern perception, and conceptually replicate this rela-
tionship for supernatural beliefs. Furthermore, these
ﬁndings suggest that participants indeed displayed sub-
stantial variation in the extent to which they detect
patterns in the random coin toss outcomes, and hence,
we use these coin tosses as the basis for our experimen-
tal manipulation in Study 2.
Study 2
In Study 2, we utilized the random coin outcome
sequences that we tested in Study 1 to manipulate
pattern search. In order to guess the next coin outcome
following each sequence, participants either were, or
were not, instructed to look for patterns in the coin
tosses. As the cognitive process of pattern perception
tends to occur particularly when people predict uncer-
tain outcomes (Gilovich et al., 1985; Wilke et al.,
2014), we reasoned that intuitively searching for
patterns in random sequences as a means to guess the
next coin toss would increase the likelihood of people
perceiving patterns in the coin toss sequences. We
therefore predicted that searching for patterns in
random sequences would increase irrational beliefs
through an increase in pattern perception.
Method
Participants and design. The study had a design
with two conditions (intuitive pattern search: high vs.
low), and was run online through the Crowdﬂower
forumon aUS sample. A total of 223 people participated
(72 men, 103 women, 48 not indicated;
Mage = 36.01 years, SD = 11.88). The study took about
15 to 20 minutes, and participants were rewarded with
a small payment (0.75 USD).
Procedure. The studywas presented as consisting of
two parts. In the ﬁrst part, participants were asked to
play a coin tossing game. They saw the outcomes of
10 sequences of 10 coin tossesthese sequences were
identical to those used in the pattern perception
1Consistent with the notion that it is often hard to distinguish random
sequences from sequences that truly emerged through a nonrandom
process (Williams & Grifﬁths, 2013), our ﬁrst string presented to partic-
ipants emerged by chance as symmetrical (HTHHHHHHTH). We there-
fore also analyzed the correlations of our ﬁnal itemasking whether
the full string of 100 coin tosses was randomwith irrational beliefs.
Results further supported the hypothesis that our three measures of ir-
rational beliefs are correlated with a tendency to perceive patterns in
random coin toss outcomes (.23 < rs < .33, ps < .001).
Table 1 Means, Standard Deviations, and Intercorrelations of the Measured Variables—Study 1
M SD 1 2 3 4
1. Belief in existing conspiracy theories 2.88 0.84 -
2. Belief in ﬁctitious conspiracy theories 2.69 0.84 .70*** -
3. Supernatural beliefs 2.46 0.69 .47*** .54*** -
4. Illusory pattern perception 2.82 1.51 .37*** .44*** .38*** -
***p < .001.
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measure of Study 1. The ﬁrst of these sequences was
presented as an example; the real coin tossing game
consisted of the remaining nine sequences.
For each sequence, participants task was to guess
what the next coin outcome would be (Heads or Tails).
Within this context, we manipulated intuitive pattern
search. In the high pattern search condition, participants
received the following instruction before starting the
game: Try to see if you can ﬁnd a pattern in each se-
quence. Do NOT try to calculate thisuse your intui-
tion. Ask yourself: Do I see a pattern hereand based
on that, what next coin outcome would make most
sense? In the low pattern search condition, partici-
pants received the following instruction: These are ran-
dom sequences, generated by the website random.org.
In a particular sequence there may be more Heads or
Tails; this is to be expected when a sequence is random.
Each coin toss is independent and has an exact probabil-
ity of 50% of being a Head or a Tail. After completing
the game, we assessed participants pattern perception
with the following item: To what extent were the coin
ﬂip sequences random, or showed a pattern? (1 = they
were totally random, 7 = they totally showed a pattern).
Furthermore, we assessed participants current mood
on a slider ranging from 1 (very negative) to 100 (very pos-
itive) as a ﬁller task and also as a means to test whether
the effects of the intuitive pattern search manipulation
are attributable to mood effects.
Participants then started the second part of the study,
in which they responded to a series of statements. Here,
we measured belief in existing conspiracy theories
(α = .84), belief in ﬁctitious conspiracy theories
(α = .86), and supernatural beliefs (α = .94) with the
same scales as in Study 1. Upon completion of the ques-
tionnaire, participants were thanked and debriefed.
Results and Discussion
Means, standard deviations, and intercorrelations of the
study variables are reported in Table 2.
Pattern perception. An ANOVA on the pattern
perception measure revealed a signiﬁcant effect of
the intuitive pattern search manipulation, F(1,
179) = 8.26, p = .005; η2 = .04. Participants in the high
pattern search condition detected clearer patterns in
the random sequences (M = 4.03, SD = 1.64) than
participants in the low pattern search condition
(M = 3.32, SD = 1.71). These ﬁndings indicate that
the manipulation successfully inﬂuenced the extent
to which participants perceived patterns in the coin
toss sequences.
Irrational beliefs. AMANOVA on the three depen-
dent variables yielded no signiﬁcant multivariate or
univariate effects, all Fs < 1. Contrary to predictions,
the intuitive pattern search manipulation did not exert
a direct effect on the dependent variables.
As noted above, however, themanipulation did inﬂu-
ence the extent to which participants perceived patterns
in the coin toss outcomes. Furthermore, consistent with
Study 1, we found that the pattern perception measure
was signiﬁcantly correlated with belief in existing con-
spiracy theories (r = .23, p = .002), belief in ﬁctitious
conspiracy theories (r = .29, p < .001), and magical ide-
ation (r = .32, p < .001). Given that we predicted the
manipulation to inﬂuence irrational beliefs because of
its effects on peoples tendency to see patterns in the se-
quences, we tested the indirect effect of the intuitive
pattern search manipulation (effect-coded: 1 high pat-
tern search, 1 low pattern search) on irrational beliefs
through pattern perception. As indicated by the fact that
0 was not in the 95% conﬁdence interval, bootstrapping
analyses (5000 samples) utilizing the MEDIATE
macro by Hayes and Preacher (2014) revealed a signiﬁ-
cant indirect effect on all three dependent variables: for
belief in existing conspiracy theories, (B = 0.04,
SE = 0.02) CI95%[0.01; 0.09], for belief in ﬁctitious con-
spiracy theories (B = 0.05, SE = 0.02) CI95%[0.02; 0.11],
and for supernatural beliefs (B = 0.05, SE = 0.02)
CI95%[0.01; 0.10]. These ﬁndings suggest that whereas
the intuitive pattern search manipulation did not exert
a direct effect on irrational beliefs, it did exert an indirect
effect on all three dependent variables through pattern
perception.
Although the lack of a direct effect precludes conclu-
sions about causality, the ﬁndings of the present study
suggest that intuitively searching for patterns in the coin
toss sequences increases pattern perception, which in
turn predicts irrational beliefs. As such, the indirect
effect that we observed in Study 2 further supports a
role for pattern perception in belief in conspiracy theo-
ries and supernatural beliefs.
Mood. The intuitive pattern search manipulation
did not inﬂuence participants mood, F < 1. Hence, the
Table 2 Means, Standard Deviations, and Intercorrelations of the Measured Variables—Study 2
M SD 1 2 3 4 5
1. Belief in existing conspiracy theories 2.84 0.77 -
2. Belief in ﬁctitious conspiracy theories 2.70 0.74 .60*** -
3. Supernatural beliefs 2.24 0.70 .49*** .52*** -
4. Illusory pattern perception 3.67 1.71 .23** .29*** .32*** -
5. Mood 68.83 18.59 .07 .14 .00 .20** -
**p < .01; ***p < .001.
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results relating to irrational beliefs are not attributable to
variations in participants mood.
Study 3
Studies 1 and 2 are consistent with the theoretical no-
tion that pattern perception is a central aspect of irratio-
nal beliefs. These ﬁndings are restricted, however, by
the fact that all coin toss sequences were random, and
therewas no base-rate comparisonwith nonrandom se-
quences. Moreover, it has been noted that randomly
generated binary sequences are often difﬁcult to distin-
guish from sequences that were truly determined
(Williams & Grifﬁths, 2013). As such, there are two in-
terpretations possible for these ﬁndings. The ﬁrst inter-
pretation is that pattern perception in general predicts
irrational beliefs. Speciﬁcally, irrational beliefs may be
associated with a generalized tendency to detect pat-
terns, rendering strong believers more likely to perceive
both illusory and real patterns. The implication of this is
that clearer perception of patterns predicts irrational be-
liefs regardless of whether these patterns are real or illu-
sory. A second interpretation, however, is that pattern
perception necessarily needs to be illusory to predict
irrational beliefs. According to this interpretation, it is
speciﬁcally perception of patterns in random or chaotic
stimuli that predict irrational beliefsnot perception of
real patterns.
In Study 3 we examined these competing interpreta-
tions by focusing on visual stimuli, that is, modern art
paintings. In particular, some of our participants evalu-
ated modern art paintings that arguably contain pat-
terns by displaying a meaningfully ordered structure.
Other participants evaluated paintings that were highly
chaotic and arguably do not contain patterns, as the
paint strokes on canvas appear largely random. These
latter paintings allow for illusory pattern perception, as
some people may start perceiving nonrandom ﬁgures
in the paint strokes. Assuming that participants see pat-
terns more clearly in the structured than in the chaotic
paintings, the two competing interpretations render
the following possibilities. If general pattern perception
(i.e., regardless of whether they are real or illusory pat-
terns) predicts irrational beliefs, then such beliefs should
increase to the extent that people perceive patterns
more clearly. Alternatively, if illusory pattern percep-
tion predicts irrational beliefs, then only perceiving pat-
terns in chaotic paintings should be associatedwith such
beliefs, not detecting the existing patterns in the struc-
tured paintings.
Method
Participants andDesign. We tested our line of rea-
soning in a design with two conditions (Modern art
paintings: structured paintings vs. unstructured paint-
ings). The study was run online through Crowdﬂower,
on a US sample. A total of 214 participants completed
the study (87 men, 118 women, 9 not indicated;
Mage = 35.00 years, SD = 11.43). Again, the study lasted
15 to 20 minutes, and participants received a small
payment (0.75 USD).
Procedure. The study was introduced as consisting
of two parts. The ﬁrst part was about evaluating mod-
ern art paintings. Participants were informed that they
would evaluate a total of nine modern art paintings, all
by the same artist. We then manipulated whether par-
ticipants saw structured or chaoticmodern art paintings.
In the structured paintings condition, participants were
informed that they would see paintings by an artist that
is well-known for his regular design and alignment of
ﬁgures, and subsequently evaluated nine paintings by
the Hungarian Artist Victor Vasarely (the name of the
painter was not disclosed to participants in either condi-
tion). We anticipated that most participants would see
clear patterns in these relatively structured paintings.
In the unstructured paintings condition, participants
were informed that theywould see paintings by an artist
that is well known for his random brush strokes and ir-
regular ﬁgures, and subsequently evaluated nine
paintings by the US artist Jackson Pollock. We antici-
pated thatmost participantswould not see clear patterns
in these relatively chaotic paintings (see the Supporting
Materials for the Vasarely and Pollock paintings that
were presented to participants).2
In both conditions, we asked three questions after
each painting. The ﬁrst two questions were designed
to disguise the true purpose of the research from partic-
ipants, and as possible control variables in the analyses:
How ugly or beautiful do you ﬁnd this painting?
(1 = very ugly, 7 = very beautiful), and How familiar are
youwith this painting? (1 = never seen before, 7 = very fa-
miliar). The third question was To what extent do you
see a pattern in this painting? (If you only see random
strokes of paint, answer 1; if you clearly see a pattern,
answer 7) (1 = not at all, 7 = very much). These ratings
were averaged into reliable 9-item scales of beauty
(α = .92), familiarity (α = .97), and pattern perception
(α = .97). After evaluating all the paintings, we asked
participants to indicate their current mood on a slider
ranging from 1 (very negative) to 100 (very positive).
Then, participants started the second part of the study,
which was about personal beliefs. In this part of the
study, we again measured belief in existing conspiracy
theories (α = .84), belief in ﬁctitious conspiracy theories
(α = .90), and supernatural beliefs (α = .93) with the
same scales as in the previous studies. At the end of
the study, participants were thanked and debriefed.
2Art specialists may differ in opinion on the question if, and towhat ex-
tent, Pollocks paintings actually are random or chaotic. More rele-
vant for the present research, however, is how participants subjectively
perceived these paintings. As reported in the Results section, themeans
on the pattern perception measure reveal that participants on average
saw little structure in these paintings, as intended.
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Results and Discussion
The Means, standard deviations, and intercorrelations
of the study variables are displayed in Table 3.
Pattern perception. An ANOVA on the pattern
perception measure revealed a signiﬁcant effect of the
modern art paintings manipulation, F(1, 204) = 311.23,
p < .001; η2 = .60. Participants clearly saw patterns in
the structured Vasarely paintings (M = 5.82, SD = 1.08),
but they did not clearly see patterns in the unstructured
Pollock paintings (M = 2.74, SD= 1.40), as intendedwith
this manipulation.
General pattern perception as predictor of
irrational beliefs. The ﬁrst possible explanation for
the previous ﬁndings is that perception of patterns in
generalregardless if they are real or illusorypredicts
stronger irrational beliefs. If this were true, one would
expect that evaluating the structured Vasarely paint-
ings, in which most people detect patterns, would
increase these beliefs as compared to evaluating the
unstructured Pollock paintings, whichmost people con-
sider to be relatively chaotic and devoid of patterns.
A MANOVA on the dependent variables revealed a
signiﬁcant multivariate effect of the manipulation, F(3,
201) = 2.64, p = .050; η2 = .04. The univariate effect
was signiﬁcant for belief in existing conspiracy theories,
F(1, 203) = 6.84, p = .010, η2 = .03, and for supernatural
beliefs, F(1, 203) = 3.89, p = .050; η2 = .02, but not for
belief in ﬁctitious conspiracy theories, F(1, 203) = 1.15,
p = .284. Contrary to the idea that general pattern per-
ception increases these beliefs, however, participants
believed existing conspiracy theories more strongly
(M = 2.95, SD = 0.79), and reported stronger supernatu-
ral beliefs (M = 2.22, SD = 0.67) after evaluating the un-
structured Pollock paintings than after evaluating the
structured Vasarely paintings (for belief in existing con-
spiracy theories, M = 2.67, SD = 0.70; for supernatural
beliefs, M = 2.03, SD = 0.68). Thus, the manipulation
exerted an effect that was opposite to the idea that irratio-
nal beliefs are grounded in general pattern perception
(i.e., including perception of truly existing patterns).
Instead, these ﬁndings are consistent with previous
ﬁndings that ambiguous stimuli increase conspiracy
beliefs (Van Harreveld et al., 2014).
Furthermore, in the overall sample the pattern
perception measure was uncorrelated with belief in
existing conspiracy theories (r =.01, p = .92), with be-
lief in ﬁctitious conspiracy theories (r = .07, p = .33), and
with magical ideation (r = .08, p = .28), revealing no
evidence for a mediational role of pattern perception
in general. Taken together, these ﬁndings do not sup-
port the idea that pattern perception predicts irrational
beliefs regardless of whether the patterns are illusory,
or widely detected by others.
Illusory pattern perception as predictor of irra-
tional beliefs. We then tested the second possible ex-
planation for the previous ﬁndings, which is that only
illusory pattern perception predicts irrational beliefs. If
this were true, then onewould expect that only perceiv-
ing patterns in the unstructured, chaotic Pollock paint-
ings predicts irrational beliefsand not recognizing the
widely detected patterns in the structured Vasarely
paintings. To test this line of reasoning, we computed
the correlations of pattern perception with both mea-
sures of conspiracy beliefs and supernatural beliefs
within each modern art painting condition separately.3
Consistent with the idea that irrational beliefs are
driven by illusory pattern perception only, perceiving
patterns in the unstructured Pollock paintings signiﬁ-
cantly predicted belief in existing conspiracy theories
(r = .36, p< .001), belief in ﬁctitious conspiracy theories
(r = .31, p = .002), and supernatural beliefs (r = .32,
p = .001). Recognizing patterns in the highly structured
Vasarely paintings, however, was unrelated to belief in
existing conspiracy theories (r = .00, p = .98) and belief
in ﬁctitious conspiracy theories (r = .03, p = .77), and
negatively predicted supernatural beliefs (r = .31,
p = .002). These correlations differed signiﬁcantly
Table 3 Means, Standard Deviations, and Intercorrelations of the Measured Variables—Study 3
M SD 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
1. Belief in existing conspiracy theories 2.81 0.75 -
2. Belief in ﬁctitious conspiracy theories 2.66 0.75 .55*** -
3. Supernatural beliefs 2.12 0.68 .50*** .49*** -
4. Pattern perception 4.28 1.99 .01 .07 .08 -
5. Perceived beauty 3.84 1.30 .11 .16* .19** .49*** -
6. Perceived familiarity 1.64 1.21 .38*** .32*** .56
***
.11 .33 -
7. Mood 72.93 17.91 .03 .11 .00 .15* .32*** .02 -
*p < .05; **p < .01; ***p < .001.
3We decided not to base our conclusions on the interaction term be-
tween the modern art painting manipulation and the continuous pat-
tern perception measure, given the strong direct effect of the
manipulation on pattern perception. Nevertheless, it is noteworthy that
this interaction termwas highly signiﬁcant for belief in existing conspir-
acy theories (β = .17, p = .017) and magical ideation (β = .32,
p < .001), and marginally signiﬁcant for belief in ﬁctitious conspiracy
theories (β = .14, p = .057).
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between conditions, as indicated by Fisher r-to-z tests
(for belief in existing conspiracy theories, z = 2.64,
p = .008; for belief in ﬁctitious conspiracy theories,
z = 2.03, p = .042; for supernatural beliefs, z = 4.59,
p < .001).
These ﬁndings suggest that only perceiving patterns
in random or chaotic stimuli (i.e., illusory pattern per-
ception) predicts irrational beliefs, and not recognizing
patterns in structured stimuli. Belief in conspiracy theo-
ries was unrelated to perception of these existing
patterns, and supernatural beliefs even predicted a
decreased capacity to recognize existing patterns.
Perceived beauty. AnANOVA on perceived beauty
revealed a signiﬁcant effect of the modern art painting
manipulation, F(1, 204) = 10.83, p = .001; η2 = .05.
Participants found the structured paintings by Vasarely
more beautiful (M = 4.13, SD = 1.16) than the unstruc-
tured paintings by Pollock (M = 3.55, SD = 1.38).
Controlling for perceived beauty in the main analyses
of the dependent variables did not change any of the
reported effects, however.
Perceived familiarity. An ANOVA on perceived
familiarity did not reveal a signiﬁcant effect of the ma-
nipulation, F < 1. Average ratings on familiarity were
very low on the scale (M = 1.64, SD = 1.21), suggesting
that participants were not familiar with the paintings.
Intriguingly, ratings of familiarity were strongly corre-
latedwith irrational beliefs (see Table 3), suggesting that
such beliefs may be grounded in a general tendency to
overestimate ones knowledgea possibility that future
research may explore further.
Mood. An ANOVA revealed no signiﬁcant effect of
the modern art painting manipulation on participants
mood, F < 1 (M = 72.93, SD = 17.91). Effects of the
manipulation can thus not be attributed to participants
mood.
Study 4
Studies 2 and 3 manipulated pattern perception and
measured irrational beliefs as dependent measures.
The results of these two studies were consistent with
the correlational ﬁndings from Study 1. In Study 4, we
aimed to ﬁnd further support for this relationship by
treating pattern perception as the dependent measure.
Speciﬁcally, we manipulated whether participants read
a short text written by a paranormal believer, a conspir-
acy theorist, or a skeptic, with various indicators of pat-
tern perception as dependent measures. We speciﬁcally
tested whether participants agreement with the para-
normal and conspiracy texts, but not their agreement
with the skeptic text, predicted their tendency to per-
ceive patterns. The study measured three indicators of
pattern perception, including the coin toss measure
(Study 1) and the extent to which participants detected
patterns in Jackson Pollocks paintings (Study 3). As a
third indicator we also assessed the extent to which
participants perceive patterns in world events, that is,
participants belief that many events in the world co-
occur not through coincidence but through a nonran-
dom process.
Method
Participants and design. The study had three con-
ditions (paranormal belief; conspiracy belief; skeptic).
We recruited a total of 455 US participants online at
the Crowdﬂower forum, of whom 401 participants
completed the study (171 men, 228 women, 2 not indi-
cated;Mage = 35.93, SD = 12.28). The study lasted about
15 minutes, and participants received a small payment
(0.75 USD).
Procedure. Participants ﬁrst read a short excerpt
that had ostensibly been taken from someones Internet
blog. We manipulated whether the writer of the blog
believed paranormal phenomena, conspiracy theories,
or whether the writer was skeptical about these issues.
For instance, in the paranormal condition, the blog
started: I believe that there are hidden forces of nature
that people do not understand yet, and that determine
many important events in life. . .. In the conspiracy
condition, the blog started: I believe that there are hid-
den organizations that inﬂuence citizens lives in ways
that people do not understand, and that explain many
events that occur in society. . .. In the skeptic condition,
the blog started: I do not believe in mysterious natural
forces or secret organizations. Although we may not
always know everything, by and large people have a
good sense of how the world works. . . (full texts in
the Supporting Materials). After the blog, we asked
whether participants agreed with the writer (1 = Not at
all, 7 = Very much), after which participants were asked
to describe a situation where hidden forces of nature
seemed at work (supernatural condition), a conspiracy
seemed at work (conspiracy condition), or events
emerged coincidentally (skeptic condition) to reinforce
the manipulation. We also assessed participants mood
on a slider (1 = Very negative, 100 = Very positive).
As dependent measures we assessed three indicators
of pattern perception. First, we assessed the extent to
which participants perceive patterns in world events
(1 = Strongly disagree, 7 = Strongly agree): Societal events
that seem unrelated frequently are in fact related,
Many things that happen in the world are no coinci-
dence, and There is a grain of truth in the saying that
the wings of a butterﬂy can cause a hurricane else-
where. We averaged these items into an indicator of
pattern perception for world events (α = .68). Further-
more, we assessed the extent to which participants
saw patterns in the Jackson Pollock paintings used in
Study 3, and averaged participants responses into a
reliable scale (patterns in paintings; α = .92). Finally,
we assessed the same coin toss measure as in Study 1
(patterns in coin tosses; α = .90). After this, participants
were thanked and debriefed.
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Results and Discussion
The means, standard deviations, and intercorrelations
of the measured variables are displayed in Table 4. We
analyzed the results with hierarchical regression analy-
ses. First, we coded the conditions as two orthogonal
contrasts designed to test our line of reasoning (Para-
normal vs. Conspiracy vs. Skeptic, Contrast 1: 1 -1 2;
Contrast 2: 11 0). Furthermore, we mean-centered
the measure of participants agreement with the writer.
We entered the two contrasts and participants agree-
mentwith thewriter in Step 1.We then added the inter-
actions of the two contrasts with agreement in Step 2.
Degrees of freedom deviated from the total sample due
to attrition during the study.
Pattern perception. The regression results are
displayed in Table 5. Step 1 was signiﬁcant for all three
indicators of pattern perception: patterns in life,
(R2 = .12) F(3, 406) = 18.60, p< .001; patterns in paint-
ings, (R2 = .03) F(3, 402) = 4.64, p = .003; patterns in
coin tosses, (R2 = .04) F(3, 398) = 5.22, p = .002. The
main effect of agreement was signiﬁcant for all three
pattern perception indicators. More importantly, we
also found a signiﬁcant main effect of the ﬁrst contrast
comparing the paranormal and conspiracy conditions
vs. the skeptic conditionon two out of three pattern
perception indicators (Patterns in life and patterns in
coin tosses; see Table 5). Participants perceived more
patterns in life in the paranormal (M = 4.38, SD = 1.22)
and conspiracy (M = 4.31, SD = 1.30) conditions than in
the skeptic condition (M = 4.24, SD = 1.13). Likewise,
participants perceived more patterns in coin tosses in
the paranormal (M = 2.62, SD = 1.24) and conspiracy
(M = 2.74, SD = 1.20) conditions than in the skeptic con-
dition (M = 2.48, SD = 1.29). The second contrastcom-
paring the paranormal vs. conspiracy conditionswas
nonsigniﬁcant for all pattern perception measures.
These ﬁndings suggest that only reading about paranor-
mal or conspiracy beliefs is sufﬁcient to cause a slight in-
crease in pattern perception.
More importantly, Step 2 was signiﬁcant for patterns
in life (ΔR2 = .10) F(2, 404) = 26.87, p < .001, and for
patterns in coin tosses (ΔR2 = .07) F(2, 396) = 16.45,
p < .001, and it was marginal for patterns in paintings
(ΔR2 = .01) F(2, 400) = 2.59, p = .076. Likewise, the cru-
cial contrast 1 x agreement interaction was highly sig-
niﬁcant for patterns in life and patterns in coin tosses,
and marginal for patterns in paintings (see Table 5).
The contrast 2 x agreement interaction was nonsigniﬁ-
cant for patterns in life and patterns in paintings, and
marginal for patterns in coin tosses.
We then examined the contrast 1 x agreement inter-
action by calculating the correlations of agreement with
the pattern perception measures within each condition.
Agreement with the paranormal blog correlated posi-
tively with pattern perception (patterns in life, r = .59,
p< .001; patterns in paintings, r = .31, p< .001; patterns
in coin tosses, r = .24, p = .006), as did agreement with
the conspiracy theory blog (patterns in life, r = .52,
p< .001; patterns in paintings, r = .16, p = .070; patterns
in coin tosses, r = .48, p < .001). Agreement with the
skeptic blog, however, correlated negatively with pat-
terns in life (r = .16, p = .065) and patterns in coin
tosses, (r = .21, p = .014) and did not correlate with
patterns in paintings (r = .05, p = .60). The relationships
of agreement with the pattern perception measures in
the three conditions are displayed graphically in
Figures 1a1c. These ﬁndings indicate that agreeing
with paranormal beliefs and conspiracy theories, but
not agreeing with a skeptic, predicts pattern perception.
Mood. In our analysis of the mood measure, Step 1
was signiﬁcant, (R2 = .02) F(3, 404) = 3.05, p = .028.
Table 4 Means, Standard Deviations, and Intercorrelations of the Measured Variables – Study 4
M SD 1 2 3 4 5
1. Patterns in life 4.32 1.22 -
2. Patterns in paintings 2.93 1.42 .16** -
3. Patterns in coin tosses 2.61 1.24 .15** .33*** -
4. Agreement 3.39 1.18 .33*** .18*** .15** -
5. Mood 65.58 21.43 .19*** .02 .07 .11* -
*p < .05; **p < .01; ***p < .001.
Table 5 Results of Hierarchical Regression Analyses – Study 4
Patterns in life Patterns in paintings Patterns in coin tosses
Step 1 B(SE) t(406) B(SE) t(402) B(SE) t(398)
Contrast 1 0.08(0.04) 2.06* 0.02(0.05) 0.41 0.10(0.04) 2.17*
Contrast 2 0.02(0.07) 0.25 0.04(0.09) 0.51 0.09(0.08) 1.13
Agreement 0.36(0.05) 7.41*** 0.21(0.06) 3.57*** 0.19(0.05) 3.57***
Step 2 B(SE) t(404) B(SE) t(400) B(SE) t(396)
Contrast 1 x Agreement 0.25(0.03) 7.32*** 0.08(0.04) 1.70
†
0.20(0.04) 5.41***
Contrast 2 x Agreement 0.04(0.05) 0.76 0.11(0.07) 1.59 0.10(0.06) 1.69†
†p < .10; *p < .05; ***p < .001.
J.-W. van Prooijen et al. Illusory pattern perception
European Journal of Social Psychology 00 (2017) 0000 © 2017 The Authors. European Journal of Social Psychology published by John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.
The effect of Contrast 2 was signiﬁcant (B = 2.68,
SE = 1.29, p = .039) and the effect of agreement was
marginal (B = 1.76, SE = 0.91, p = .053). Step 2was non-
signiﬁcant, (ΔR2 = .01) F(2, 402) = 1.87, p = .16. The cru-
cial contrast 1 x agreement interaction can hence not be
attributed to participants mood.
Study 5
Studies 1 to 4 all support the idea that irrational beliefs
are related with illusory pattern perception. These ﬁnd-
ings emerged when manipulating pattern search, with
irrational belief as dependent measure (Studies 2 and
3) as well as when manipulating whether participants
read about irrational beliefs, with pattern perception as
dependent measure (Study 4). In Study 5, we assessed
the theoretical and practical implications of the relation-
ship between irrational beliefs and pattern perception.
Speciﬁcally, we examined whether pattern perception
constitutes an explanation for the frequently observed
relationships between conceptually unrelated irrational
beliefs.
A common research ﬁnding is that belief in one con-
spiracy theory predicts belief in other, unrelated
conspiracy theories. This ﬁnding is usually interpreted
as evidence that acceptance of one conspiracy theory
reinforces a more general belief system assuming that
the world is being governed by conspiracies (i.e., a
monological belief system, or a conspiratorial
mindset; see Goertzel, 1994; Douglas & Sutton, 2011;
Lewandowsky, Oberauer, & Gignac, 2013; Swami
et al., 2010, 2011, 2013; Van Prooijen et al., 2015;
Wood, Douglas, & Sutton, 2012; but see Sutton &
Douglas, 2014). What we ﬁnd problematic about this
interpretation, however, is that acceptance of a
conspiracy theory is also a strong predictor of non-
conspiratorial forms of belief. A robust ﬁnding in
irrational belief research is that conspiracy beliefs and
supernatural beliefs are strongly intercorrelated
(Barron et al., 2014; Darwin et al., 2011; Lobato
et al., 2014; Newheiser et al., 2011; Swami et al.,
2011), a ﬁnding that we replicated in the current
research (see Tables 13).
Previous research offers various explanations for the
link between conspiracy theories and supernatural
beliefs, such as anti-conformist tendencies and an
inclination to reject conventional explanations or au-
thority opinions (e.g., Swami et al., 2011). We propose
an additional explanation for this relationship: A
conspiracy theory often describes speciﬁc meaningful
relationships between world events that perceivers as-
sume to have taken place (e.g., the conspiracy theory
that democratic bankers caused the ﬁnancial crisis to
get Obama elected; or, the conspiratorial inferences
drawn from the observation that Donald Rumsfeld
happened to be in the opposite side of the Pentagon
when the plane hit the building on 9/11/2001). Put dif-
ferently, acceptance of a conspiracy theory implies an
increase in the extent to which people perceive pat-
terns in world events, as reﬂected in the belief that
instead of being a coincidence, many events that
happen in the world are somehow causally related.
This perception of patterns in world events is associ-
ated with other, unrelated irrational beliefs. Consis-
tently, it has been suggested previously that
supernatural beliefs are rooted in a failure to appreci-
ate that events often co-occur by coincidence (Black-
more & Trościanko, 1985).
To test this line of reasoning, in Study 5 we manipu-
lated belief in a conspiracy theory through a validated
procedure (cf. Jolley & Douglas, 2014a, 2014b). While
in Study 4 participants read a rather broad text about
a person believing conspiracy theories, in Study 5 par-
ticipants read an Internet excerpt either underscoring
or undermining the validity of a speciﬁc conspiracy the-
ory by presenting focused arguments. We predicted
that this conspiracy theory manipulation would in-
crease the extent to which people generally believe
events in the world to be somehow related (i.e., pattern
perception of world events), which in turn predicts
conceptually unrelated conspiracy beliefs and supernat-
ural beliefs.
Method
Participants and design. We ran the study online
via the Crowdﬂower website on a US sample. The de-
sign had two conditions, one in which participants read
an article supporting conspiracy theories (pro-conspir-
acy condition) and one in which participants read an
Fig. 1: (A–C) The Relationships of Agreement with Pattern Perception
Study 4 [Colour ﬁgure can be viewed at wileyonlinelibrary.com]
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article not supporting conspiracy theories (anti-conspir-
acy condition). The study lasted about 15 minutes.
There were 228 participants (95 men, 119 women, 14
missing; Mage = 35.91 years, SD = 11.80) who received
a small payment for participation (0.75 USD).
Procedure. Participants read a fragment from a
purported Internet article in which we manipulated
information about conspiracy theories. We adapted
the manipulation from Jolley and Douglas (2014a) but
tailored it towards a US context. In the pro-conspiracy
condition, the article described that there are many
good reasons to be suspicious of governmental opera-
tions. Subsequently, the article speciﬁcally highlighted
the NSA surveillance program, emphasizing how the
NSA keeps track of communication betweenUS citizens
on a widespread scale; and, the 9/11 attacks, emphasiz-
ing that there are many inconsistencies in the ofﬁcial
accounts. In the anti-conspiracy condition, the article
described that there are very few reasons to be suspi-
cious of governmental operations. Then, the article em-
phasized how the NSA surveillance program essentially
is a computer algorithm to detect suspicious activity, de-
signed to ensure citizens safety. Also, the article de-
scribed that as to the 9/11 attacks, there is no evidence
to support other accounts than the ofﬁcial one (the ex-
act wording can be found in the Supporting Materials).
To check the manipulation, we asked the following
questions (1 = not at all, 7 = very much): Is there reason
for concern about the NSA security programs?, Is
there reason to think that the NSA listens to private
phone conversations that are unrelated to terrorist
plots?, Is there reason to think that the NSA reads
the content of e-mail and Internet chat messages that
are unrelated to terrorist plots?, and Is there reason
to be suspicious about other governmental operations
besides the NSAs surveillance programs?. These items
were averaged into a reliable manipulation check scale
(α = .91). In addition, we again measured participants
mood on a slider (1 = very negative, 100 = very positive).
We then assessed the extent to which people perceive
patterns in world events with the same measure as in
Study 4 (α = .68). After this, we measured belief in
existing conspiracy theories unrelated to those varied
in the experimental manipulation. Given the reference
to the US government in the manipulation, we selected
only the ﬁve items from the belief in existing conspiracy
theories scale assessed in the previous studies that made
no explicit reference to the US government (i.e., the
items about Ebola, global warming, oil companies, the
moon landing, and HIV/AIDS; α = .81).4 Furthermore,
we again assessed belief in ﬁctitious conspiracy theories
(α = .90) and supernatural beliefs (α = .94) utilizing the
same scales as in the previous studies. At the end of the
study, participants were thanked and debriefed.
Results and Discussion
The means, standard deviations, and intercorrelations
of the measured variables are displayed in Table 6.
Manipulation check. An ANOVA revealed stron-
ger belief in a NSA conspiracy theory in the pro-
conspiracy condition (M = 5.35, SD = 1.27) than in the
anti-conspiracy condition (M = 3.34, SD = 1.48), F(1,
214) = 115.15, p < .001; η2 = .35. These results indicate
that the manipulation worked as intended.
Pattern perception for world events. On the
scale measuring the extent to which participants saw
patterns in world events, the conspiracy manipulation
exerted a signiﬁcant effect albeit with a small effect size,
F(1, 213) = 5.35, p = .022; η2 = .03. Participants per-
ceived more patterns in world events in the pro-
conspiracy condition (M = 4.73, SD = 1.10) than in the
anti-conspiracy condition (M = 4.36, SD = 1.25). These
results support the idea that conspiracy theorizing
increases the perception of patterns in world events.
Irrational beliefs. We then analyzed the three de-
pendent variables with a MANOVA. The multivariate
effect was marginal, F(3, 211) = 2.24, p = .085;
η
2 = .03, and the univariate effect was only signiﬁcant
for belief in existing conspiracy theories, F(1,
213) = 5.72, p = .018; η2 = .03 (pro-conspiracy condition
M = 2.64, SD = 0.89; anti-conspiracy conditionM = 2.36,
SD = 0.86), and not for belief in a ﬁctitious conspiracy
theory (F < 1) or supernatural beliefs, F(1, 213) = 1.05,
p = .31; η2 = .005.
Further testing revealed, however, that the three de-
pendent variables all were signiﬁcantly correlated with
4If we analyzed the full 9-item scale including the items referring to the
US government, results were similar. Speciﬁcally, the effect of the con-
spiracy manipulation was signiﬁcant, F(1, 214) = 8.01, p = .005;
η
2
= .04, as was the indirect effect through pattern perception for world
events (B = 0.05, SE = .03) CI95%[.01; 0.11].
Table 6 Means, Standard Deviations, and Intercorrelations of the Measured Variables—Study 5
M SD 1 2 3 4 5 6
1. Belief in existing conspiracy theories 2.51 0.89 -
2. Belief in ﬁctitious conspiracy theories 2.72 0.78 .61*** -
3. Supernatural beliefs 2.29 0.72 .59*** .55*** -
4. Manipulation check 4.38 1.70 .18** .16* .07 -
5. Pattern perception for world events 4.55 1.18 .36*** .43*** .23** .38*** -
6. Mood 67.11 19.77 .11 .09 .11 .06 .13 -
*p < .05; **p < .01; ***p < .001.
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the measure of pattern perception in world events (for
belief in existing conspiracy theories, r = .36, p < .001;
for belief in a ﬁctitious conspiracy theory, r = .43,
p < .001; and for supernatural beliefs, r = .23,
p < .001). Consistent with our line of reasoning, we
therefore proceeded to test the indirect effect of the
conspiracy manipulation on our dependent variables
through pattern perception in world events.
Bootstrapping analyses (5000 samples) utilizing the
MEDIATE macro (Hayes & Preacher, 2014) revealed a
signiﬁcant indirect effect for all three dependent vari-
ables: for belief in existing conspiracy theories
(B = 0.05, SE= 0.02) CI95%[0.01; 0.10]; for belief in a ﬁc-
titious conspiracy theory (B = 0.05, SE = 0.02)
CI95%[0.01; 0.11]; and for supernatural beliefs
(B = 0.03, SE = 0.01) CI95%[0.004; 0.06]. These ﬁndings
reveal that being exposed to a conspiracy theory in-
creased the extent to which people perceive patterns
in world events, which in turn predicts a range of unre-
lated irrational beliefs. This ﬁnding supports our line of
reasoning.
Mood. There was no effect of the conspiracy manip-
ulation on participantsmood, F(1, 216) = 1.45, p = .23;
η
2 = .01. The effects of the manipulation on world
pattern perception and the dependent variables are thus
not attributable to participants mood.
General Discussion
Although people hold many different conspiracy and
supernatural beliefs, psychological theories have as-
sumed such beliefs to be rooted in largely similar under-
lying cognitive processes, speciﬁcally illusory pattern
perceptionthat is, a tendency to perceive meaningful
patterns in stimuli that were actually generated through
a random process (Shermer, 2011;Whitson & Galinsky,
2008;Wiseman&Watt, 2006). Given how fundamental
this assumption is within this research domain, it is
surprising toﬁndhow little direct evidence exists for this
assertion, particularly in the context of conspiracy theo-
ries. In the present study, our aim was to offer ﬁrmer
empirical grounds for the role of pattern perception in
irrational beliefs. Study 1 revealed signiﬁcant correla-
tions between conspiracy beliefs, supernatural beliefs,
and a tendency to perceive patterns in randomness. In
Study 2 we manipulated participants intuitive pattern
search, and results revealed an indirect effect such that
intuitive pattern search predicted pattern perception,
which in turn predicted irrational belief. Study 3
focused on visual stimuli. We found that only seeing
patterns in chaotic stimuli predicted irrational beliefs,
and not detecting patterns in structured stimuli. In
Study 4, we manipulated whether participants read
either a paranormal, conspiracist, or skeptic blog, and
results revealed that only agreement with the paranor-
mal and conspiracist blogs positively predicted pattern
perception. Finally, in Study 5 we tested how pattern
perception connects conceptually unrelated beliefs.
Following a manipulation of belief in one conspiracy
theory, people saw events in the world asmore strongly
causally connected, which in turn predicted unrelated
irrational beliefs. Taken together, these ﬁndings support
the assumption that illusory pattern perception is a basic
cognitive aspect of the conspiracy and supernatural
beliefs under investigation here.
One might note that randomly generated stimuli
sometimes produce sequences that appear to contain
actual patterns. Indeed, some of our coin toss se-
quences contain relatively long chunks of the same
outcome (Heads or Tails), making it difﬁcult for people
to discriminate between real and illusory patterns (Wil-
liams & Grifﬁths, 2013). We propose, however, that
this is precisely one reason why people hold irrational
beliefs. People often fail to appreciate how likely it is
that a random process generates stimuli that appear
nonrandom (Falk & Konold, 1997). As a consequence,
people tend to underestimate the likelihood that the
patterns they perceive occurred through a random
process. In a similar vein, people often encounter co-
occurring events in their daily life that appear
nonrandom or purposeful, but that in fact were entirely
coincidental (e.g., thinking of an old friend who then
suddenly calls). The difﬁculty of distinguishing between
sequences that were generated through a random vs.
nonrandom process mirrors the difﬁculty of
distinguishing between events that did vs. did not
co-occur through coincidence.
At ﬁrst blush, the present ﬁndings seem inconsistent
with a study that did not ﬁnd signiﬁcant correlations be-
tween pattern perception in binary outcomes and con-
spiracy beliefs (Dieguez et al., 2015). Closer inspection
suggests two possible ways in which these diverging
ﬁndings may be integrated by future research. As a ﬁrst
observation, the binary outcomes presented to partici-
pants in the study by Dieguez and colleagues (strings
of 12) were not produced by a random generator, but
instead were chosen to vary in their level of complexity.
Indeed, one of their research goals was to assess how
well subjective randomness correlates with actual ran-
domness, and correspondingly, some of their strings
were highly unlikely to occur through a randomprocess
(e.g., a string with 12 times the same outcome). We
speculate here that people who are good at detecting
randomness are also likely to be good at detecting
nonrandomness. Hence, their measure of subjective
randomness combinedmisperception of patterns in ran-
dom sequences with correct detection of patterns in
nonrandom sequences, within the same score. It is con-
ceivable that the inclusion of nonrandom sequences
suppressed correlations with conspiracy beliefs.
As a second observation, at least in two of the studies
by Dieguez et al. (2015), participants were undergradu-
ate students (in their third study, education level of par-
ticipants was not reported). Previous research found
that probability biases and paranormal beliefs are corre-
lated in general population samples but not in univer-
sity samples (Blagrove et al., 2006; Bressan, 2002),
suggesting that the relationship between illusory pat-
tern perception and irrational beliefs does not emerge
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in the highly educated strata. This is consistent with the
observation that people with high education levels, or
with strong analytic thinking skills, are less susceptible
to irrational beliefs than people with low education
levels or weak analytic thinking skills (Aarnio &
Lindeman, 2005; Douglas et al., 2016; Gervais &
Norenzayan, 2012; Musch & Ehrenberg, 2002; Swami,
Voracek, Stieger, Tran, & Furnham, 2014; Van Prooijen,
2017). Clearly, more research is needed to fully estab-
lish the conditions under which pattern perception
does, and does not, predict irrational beliefs. Our re-
search suggests, however, that it would be premature
to dismiss illusory pattern perception as a cognitive
mechanism underlying irrational beliefs on the basis of
only one set of studies that did not ﬁnd evidence for this
mechanism.
Limitations and Future Research
In Study 2, and for some of the dependent variables in
Study 5, we only found an indirect effect, and not a di-
rect effect of the manipulation on irrational beliefs. We
suspect that the relatively large base-rate variance in
these variables precludes a direct inﬂuence of relatively
subtle manipulations in between-subjects designs.
Speciﬁcally, from the outset people differ substantially
in how strongly they endorse conspiracy theories and
supernatural beliefs, with some people being convinced
skeptics and others being highly susceptible to such be-
liefs. People are also likely therefore to vary signiﬁcantly
in their sensitivity to subtle experimental manipula-
tions. Although the lack of a direct effect precludes
strong conclusions about cause and effect, one should
bear in mind that the main purpose of this research
was to illuminate the extent to which illusory pattern
perception is part of the underlying cognitive processes
that support irrational beliefs. As the results reveal, illu-
sory pattern perception was quite susceptible to the
experimental manipulations, which subsequently
accounted for peoples irrational beliefs. These ﬁndings
were highly robust across studies, and were observed
on two different measures of conspiracy beliefs (i.e., real
and ﬁctitious conspiracy theories), and on an extensive
and validated measure of supernatural belief (Eckblad
& Chapman, 1983).
In the present contribution we predominantly focus
on the cognitive similarities between conspiracy beliefs
and supernatural beliefs. Illusory pattern perception is
one of the processes that binds these types of irrational
beliefs, and is likely part of the reason why these beliefs
are strongly correlated (Barron et al., 2014; Darwin
et al., 2011; Lobato et al., 2014; Newheiser et al., 2011;
Swami et al., 2011). Study 5 empirically examined
whether the relationship between unrelated irrational
beliefs is attributable to the assumption that seemingly
unrelated events in the world are causally connected
(i.e., perceiving patterns inworld events). Onemight ar-
gue that our measure of perceiving patterns in world
events conceptually overlaps with the irrational beliefs
under investigation here, as both conspiracy theories
and supernatural beliefs inherently assume causal con-
nections between world events. Note, however, that in
Study 4 our measure of patterns in world events corre-
lated signiﬁcantly with other indicators of pattern
perception, suggesting good construct validity (see
Table 4). Furthermore, in Study 5 our measure of pat-
terns in world events correlated moderately but not
stronglywithirrationalbeliefs(seeTable6;.22<rs< .44),
suggesting related but distinct constructs. Nevertheless,
we regard the assumption that pattern perception
mediates empirical relationships between conceptually
unrelated irrational beliefs as preliminary, and more
research is needed to further examine this issue.
Besides similarities, we should recognize that there
are also qualitative differences between conspiracy
beliefs and supernatural beliefs. Unlike supernatural be-
liefs, conspiracy beliefs typically have a clear intergroup
dimension given that by deﬁnition a hostile outgroup
(i.e., the conspiracy) is considered to be deceptive and
threatening to ones ingroup (e.g., fellow citizens;
Crocker, Luhtanen, Broadnax, & Blaine, 1999; Kramer
& Schaffer, 2014; Van Prooijen & Van Lange, 2014).
Moreover, the margin of error differs for both types of
irrational beliefs. Whereas most supernatural beliefs
are impossible given the laws of physics as we currently
understand them, conspiracy theories often can at least
theoretically be trueand sometimes conspiracies do
occur (e.g., Watergate; the Tuskegee syphilis experi-
ment; the Milli Vanilli entertainment fraud), which
may reinforce other, less realistic conspiracy theories.
Future research focusing on irrational beliefsmay clarify
not only their similarities, but also their differences in
terms of underlying psychological processes.
Concluding Remarks
It has frequently been noted that both conspiracy and
supernatural beliefs are widespread among the popula-
tion of normal, mentally sane adults (Lindeman &
Aarnio, 2007; Oliver & Wood, 2014; Sunstein &
Vermeule, 2009; Wiseman & Watt, 2006). Why are
these irrational beliefs so widespread? In the present
research, we addressed this question by focusing on
the cognitive processes underlying irrational beliefs.
The answer that emerges from our data is that irrational
beliefs are associated with a distortion of an otherwise
normal and functional cognitive process, namely, pat-
tern perception. People need to detect existing patterns
in order to function well in their physical and social
environment; however, this process also leads them to
sometimes detect patterns in chaotic or randomly
generated stimuli. Whereas the role of illusory pattern
perception has frequently been suggested as a core
process underlying irrational beliefs, the actual evidence
for this assertion hitherto was unsatisfactory. The
present ﬁndings offer empirical evidence for the role of
illusory pattern perception in irrational beliefs. We
conclude that illusory pattern perception is a central
cognitive ingredient of beliefs in conspiracy theories
and supernatural phenomena.
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